Redealing the Cards: How the Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies the Political Economy of Environmental Policies by Joan Canton
This paper can be downloaded without charge at: 
 
The Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei Note di Lavoro Series Index: 
http://www.feem.it/Feem/Pub/Publications/WPapers/default.htm 
  







The opinions expressed in this paper do not necessarily reflect the position of 
Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei 




Redealing the Cards:  
How the Presence of an Eco-
Industry Modifies the Political 
Economy of Environmental Policies
Joan Canton  
 

























Redealing the Cards: How The Presence of an Eco-Industry Modifies 
the Political Economy of Environmental Policies 
 
Summary 
An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected. Its objective 
function encompasses both social welfare and political contributions. Its only 
instrument is a pollution tax. In an open-economy context, we introduce an eco-industry 
in addition to lobbies of polluting firms and environmentalists. Not only does the eco-
industry lobby add a new political contribution toward a higher environmental tax, it 
also modifies the incentives of the usual lobbies. When the foreign environmental 
policy is constant, environmentalists can be in favor of a decrease in the local tax in 
order to reduce foreign pollution. It could also be in the interest of a vertical industrial 
pressure group to lobby toward more stringent environmental policy. In general, the 
impact of lobbying activities on the politically optimal tax is ambiguous as pressure 
groups push in different directions. 
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The usual analysis of environmental lobbying activities focuses on the role played by environ-
mentalists and polluters. However, the interests of the other stakeholders deserve some consid-
eration in order to understand the various stakes of environmental policy-making. Herein, we
introduce the lobby of the environment industry, also called the eco-industry. The eco-industry
consists of activities that measure, prevent, limit, minimize or correct environmental damages
(OECD 1999). Examples of lobbying activities from this sector are common, notably in Brus-
sels to the European institutions. For instance, two eco-industry associations|the UK-based
Environmental Industries Commission (EIC) and the European Committee of Environmental
Technology Suppliers Associations (EUCESTA)|have launched a new campaign to gain recog-
nition for the bene¯ts they bring to the economy and society by cutting down pollution. They
want the Commission's Impact assessment to consider the economic bene¯ts of environmen-
tal protection measures, such as reduced health costs, cost savings to mainstream industry from
more e±cient use of resources and innovation and competitiveness in environmental technologies.
More interestingly, an energy-e±ciency coalition of eco-industry associations and environmen-
tal NGOs have launched a common campaign on the need to promote energy-e±ciency and
strengthen the Energy Services directive.1 The abatement sector lobby is also relatively e±cient
in in°uencing the environmental policy of climate change. For instance, the German Electricity
Feed-In Law subsidizing renewable electricity was maintained in 1997 after a big e®ort by the
German Wind Energy Association (Michaelowa 1998, Michaelowa 2004).
Furthermore, the presence of an eco-industry sector can explain unusual behaviors from
traditional lobbies. One of the best examples concerns Greenpeace France in the case of the
French aircraft carrier Cl¶ emenceau. This ship, full of asbestos, was supposed to be sent to India
by the French government, where she would be dismantled by a local eco-industry. Greenpeace
France imposed a strong lobby campaign on the French government to cancel its decision. In
other words, Greenpeace France pushed for an increase in domestic pollution as well as a decrease
in foreign pollution. They thought that the Indian eco-industry was not able to dismantle her
without signi¯cant environmental damage for local workers and population. Another example
is the case of clean development mechanisms (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol. CDM are a way to
lessen the burden of climate policies in countries listed in Annex 1 by including the ¯nancing of
foreign abatement investments. These mechanisms have been highly supported by environmental
NGOs because there was the risk that countries not included in Annex 1 would increase their
emissions so much that it would cancel out the e®orts made by developed countries. In these
two examples, environmentalists took their lobby decisions not only based on the amount of
pollution at home but also in a foreign country. This causes one to wonder why they did not
try to directly lobby the foreign government. In both cases, the institutional framework of the
1http://www.foeeurope.org/climate/download/Joint statement Energy services Directive Final.pdf
2foreign country could not allow the implementation of stringent environmental policies. In the
case of greenhouse gases, it is simply because the Kyoto Protocol does not recognize binding
agreements in developing countries. In the case of asbestos, the Indian government has to
consider the trade-o® between poverty and environment. Increasing environmental regulations
would reduce the competitiveness of Indian ¯rms. Furthermore, the environment is considered
as a superior good, which means that the environmental damage of one unit of pollution is
positively correlated with income. Therefore, we consider in this analysis that local lobbies
cannot in°uence the foreign environmental regulation, set at a given low level.
Another example of unexpected behavior concerns the European Directive 93/59/CEE on
car polluting emissions. First, the Directive was supposed to demand relatively low emission
reductions, but it soon became a question of which abatement technology was going to be used:
a catalytic converter or a clean motor. The introduction of catalytic converters was favorable
to German manufacturers because their eco-industry sub-contractors|mainly Bosch|had the
capacity to produce this technology. On the other hand, French manufacturer Peugeot had
invented a clean motor and its former chairman Jacques Calvet was lobbying to impose it as
the new European environmental norm. The clean motor was more e±cient for low emission
reductions, so German manufacturers and their eco-industry pushed toward a more restrictive
environmental regulation so that their technology would become the most e±cient one. By the
end of the legislative process, the Directive was more restrictive than the ¯rst draft, giving a
competitive advantage to German car manufacturers.
If the empirical proof of the role of the eco-industry on lobbying activities is abundant, a
detailed theoretical analysis remains to be made. Lobbying activities are often seen as one of
the reasons justifying why environmental policies di®er so much from what the economic theory
has recommended. It can be a question of the choice of instruments|Buchanan & Tullock (1975)
showed why polluting ¯rms tend to prefer direct control mechanisms rather than incentive-based
environmental policies, even though the latter are more e±cient2|or it can be a question related
to the stringency of the policy (see Oates & Portney (2001) for a good survey). This model
tries to answer the second question by exploring the collective choice facet of environmental
policymaking. We model the environmental regulatory choice as one in which interest groups
vie with one another through a political process to determine the extent of environmental policies.
The government pursues its own goals, seeking a mixture of political contributions and social
welfare. Only one instrument is available, an environmental tax. We detail the political behavior
of three lobbies, polluters, environmentalists and the eco-industry. Then, we derive the impact
of lobbying activities on the politically optimal environmental taxation.
Our work is based on two strands of literature. First, it refers to the existing normative
literature on eco-industries. This literature explains how the market power of these ¯rms modi¯es
2Boyer & La®ont (1999) show why constitutional constraints on the instruments of environmental policy can
be desirable when they impose limitations on the politicians' ability to distribute rents.
3the optimal environmental policy that should be chosen by a benevolent regulator (David &
Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005, Nimubona & Sinclair-Desgagn¶ e 2005, Canton et al. 2005). The eco-
industry sector is modeled as competing µ a la Cournot, the last two papers adding imperfect
competition among polluting ¯rms. As the price of environmental goods and services is ¯xed
above marginal cost, it is in the interest of the regulator to increase the tax above the traditional
Pigouvian tax so as to give enough incentives for abatement activities. This impact should
be balanced with the negative incentives that imperfect competition among polluting ¯rms
induce on the optimal pollution tax.3 In an open economy context, the eco-industry sector
can be a source of strategic environmental policies (Fees & Muehlheusser 2002, Greaker 2006,
Canton 2006) or can imply heterogeneous tax rates across polluting sectors (Copeland 2005) so
as to bene¯t from economies of scale within the abatement sector without compromising the
competitiveness of the polluting industry. In all these papers, even though the eco-industry is
considered as highly concentrated, it is always assumed that the sector takes for granted the
environmental policy. In contrast, the present model allows us to consider cases where the
eco-industry in°uences the choice of environmental regulation.
In order to do so, we refer to the literature on the political economy of environmental policies.
An incumbent government maximizes its chances of being reelected. In this context, its objective
function encompasses both social welfare and political contributions. Political contributions are
proposed by lobby groups in a two-stage game. Lobby groups move ¯rst and simultaneously o®er
the government contribution schedules that specify the payment to be made to the government as
a function of the pollution tax. Taking the contribution schedules and the economic behavior of
the private sector as given, the government moves second and implements the politically optimal
pollution tax. This standard game was ¯rst applied to environmental policies by Fredriksson
(1997) and Aidt (1998). The ¯rst paper discusses politically optimal policies depending on lobby
group membership and the relative importance of lobbying activities. It also introduces pollution
abatement subsidies and shows that total pollution may be increasing, due to altered in°uence
of the lobby groups in the political equilibrium. The second paper derives the characteristics of
endogenous optimal environmental policy and shows that lobbying activities can be a source of
internalization of economic externalities. More recently, in an open economy context, Conconi
(2003) and Aidt (2005) discussed cases where environmentalists are in favor of a decrease in
environmental taxation. Pollution leakage4 in the ¯rst analysis and a direct interest in foreign
pollution in the second explain these unintuitive results. One of the aims of this paper is to
con¯rm these results by including the eco-industry. It introduces a third agent, which enables
us to demonstrate that international interactions among polluters are not necessary to conclude
that environmentalists can be in favor of a reduction in domestic environmental taxation.
3See also Requate (2005) on how to give enough incentives to ¯rms for increasing their abatement activities.
4In the rest of the paper, we call pollution leakage the impact of emissions in one country on the other
country's welfare through transboundary pollution. We call emission leakage the impact of a change in the
domestic environmental tax on foreign emissions through the change in the price of abatement activities.
4We maintain in our model an open economy context. In two countries, two polluting sectors
are subject to an environmental taxation. An eco-industry sector arises which supplies polluting
¯rms in abatement activities. Abatement goods and services are assumed to be internationally
traded, creating the only industrial interaction between the countries. Therefore, emission leak-
age takes place through the impact of the domestic tax on the price of environmental goods,
which modi¯es abatement incentives in the foreign country. Pollution can be transboundary or
purely local. All cases are considered. Our main ¯ndings can be summarized as follows: ¯rst,
the eco-industry lobbies in favor of more stringent environmental policies. Not surprisingly,
polluting ¯rms always lobby against tighter environmental policies. However, a more stringent
environmental taxation can be favorable to a lobby maximizing joint pro¯ts of the polluting
sector and the eco-industry, if foreign rent-shifting cancels out for the increase in the tax burden
and production costs. We also show that an environmental pressure group can ask for a decrease
in the environmental taxation at home in order to decrease pollution abroad. This result only
relies on interactions between countries within the eco-industry sector. In general, the impact
of lobbying activities on the politically optimal environmental policy is ambiguous.
The rest of the paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model. Section
3 examines the political model and the contributions of each lobby group. Section 4 gives the
politically optimal pollution tax and discusses some comparative statics. Section 5 sums up our
work.
2 The economic model
There are two countries in the economy, the superscript ¤ standing for foreign variables. The
local country has four types of citizens, consumers C, environmentalists E and shareholders
divided into unethical shareholders US and ethical shareholders ES. The size of the population
is normalized to one. As already explained in introduction, we consider that the foreign envi-
ronmental policy is temporarily ¯xed. It implies that the institutional framework does not allow
the foreign government to behave strategically.
Consider a representative polluting ¯rm, producing a given commodity x at a world and
domestic price P. On the commodity x market, both countries are too small to in°uence world
prices. cd(x) is the production cost function, twice di®erentiable and increasing and convex, i.e.
8x 2 R+, c0
d(x) > 0 and c"
d(x) > 0. This activity generates some pollution which is summarized
by an emission function ²(x). This function, identical for all ¯rms is assumed to be increasing and
convex with the level of production, i.e. 8x 2 R+, ²0(x) > 0 and ²"(x) > 0. Pollution is taxed at
a per-unit rate t, giving ¯rms an incentive to reduce this undesirable by-product by starting a
clean-up activity which requires some speci¯c inputs ad sold by an upstream eco-industry at a
price p. The e±ciency of this activity is given by a function w(ad) which measures the amount of
5pollution cleaned by the purchase of ad environmental goods. We assume that the technology is
characterized by a decreasing marginal productivity, i.e. 8ad 2 R+, w0(ad) > 0 and w"(ad) < 0.
We also add that limad!0 w0(ad) = +1 and limad!+1 w0(ad) = 0. More environmental goods
consumed decrease the net amount of pollution, but at a decreasing rate.
From this point of view, the representative polluting ¯rm maximizes the following pro¯t
function over two variables, x and ad:
max
x;ad
¦ = Px ¡ cd(x) ¡ pad ¡ te(x;ad) (1)
where e(x;ad) = ²(x) ¡ w(ad) is the net emission function. Polluting ¯rms are price-takers in
both the output and the eco-industry market. Abatement decisions are additively separable to
production decisions5, i.e. exad(x;ad) = 0. First order conditions of pro¯t maximization are:
P = c0
d(x) + t²0(x) (2)
p = tw0(ad) (3)
Equation 2 determines the optimal level of production of the ¯nal good. The overall demand
in abatement activities is determined by including the optimal decision of the foreign polluting
¯rm. It optimizes its abatement decisions such that p = t¤w0(a¤
d). Under our assumptions











Abatement activities are supplied by the eco-industry. The environmental market is composed
of two ¯rms, one based in each country and selling indi®erently environmental goods and services
to ¯rms in both countries.6 Since the players of the upstream eco-industry are able, as usually
in a subgame perfect equilibrium, to anticipate the behaviors of downstream ¯rms, the expected
demand in environmental goods is given by:












where A denotes the expected total amount of environmental goods produced by the eco-industry.
Lemma 1 An increase in the domestic pollution tax shifts upward the demand in environmental
goods.








. In equilibrium, ª(p;t;t¤) = 0.
5This assumption simpli¯es the algebra without changing the main results of the model.
6Paragraph 31(iii) of the World Trade Organization's 2001 Doha Development Agenda mandates negotiations
at the WTO on \the reduction or, as appropriate, elimination of tari® and non-tari® barriers to environmental
goods and services" (Steenblick et al. 2005). Even if this objective has not been ful¯lled yet, we simplify the
analysis by assuming that no tari®s or transport costs limits the trade of environmental goods and services.













8f a C2 function, (f0¡1)0(z) = 1
f00(f0¡1(z)) if f00(f0¡1(z)) 6= 0, so we have @ª




t. As z decreases in t and w00 ¡
w0¡1(z)
¢
< 0; 8z 2 R¤
+, we have that @ª
@t < 0. Following the
same method, @ª
@p > 0. Therefore,
@p
@t > 0. ¤
8t;t¤ > 0 the demand function is continuous and strictly decreasing in p. Therefore, it can
be invertible, which yields: p = !¡1(as + a¤
s;t;t¤), where as is the production of the domestic
eco-industry and a¤
s the production of the foreign one. The domestic eco-industry ¯rm supports
a production cost cu(as). It is assumed that marginal production costs are constant for both
¯rms, i.e. c0
u(as) = cu and c¤0
u (a¤
s) = c¤
u, with cu S c¤
u. The domestic eco-industry ¯rm is going
to produce the amount of environmental goods that maximizes its pro¯ts:
max
as
¦up = p(A;t;t¤)as ¡ cu(as) (4)
Appendix 6.1 summarizes su±cient conditions for a unique equilibrium in the environment
market. Appendix 6.2 provides some comparative statics, where it is shown that dx
dt < 0 and
dA
dt > 0. In other words, an increase in the domestic tax is always going to decrease the domestic
production in ¯nal goods. In terms of abatement activities, the demand is switched upward
when t is higher. It has a negative impact on foreign demand in abatement activities, leading to
an increase in foreign emissions. This decrease in foreign demand is more than compensated by
an increase in domestic demand, which explains why overall environmental production increases.
All citizens have the same preferences with respect to goods and environmental quality at
home, but di®er with respect to their source of income and in their concern about pollution
abroad. The baseline utility function is:
U = u(x) + y ¡ ºE(X;A) (5)
where y is a numeraire good, produced with constant returns to scale and labor only, with a
world and domestic price equal to 1. E(X;A) = (1 ¡ µ)e(x;ad) + µe(x¤;a¤
d) stands for the
amount of local pollution with e(x;ad) the emissions of domestic polluting ¯rms and e(x¤;a¤
d)
the foreign ones. We assume u0
x > 0 and u00
x · 0.7 Following Conconi (2003), domestic consumers
are a®ected by foreign emissions through a parameter µ 2 [0;1=2]. When µ = 0, pollution is
purely local whereas when µ = 1=2, pollution is purely global. º is the marginal environmental
damage of each unit of pollution, strictly positive and constant.
Following Aidt (2005) we assume that a proportion ¹ ®E of the country's population are envi-
ronmentalists. They di®er from normal citizens as they care about pollution abroad. In addition
7The choice of quasi-linear utility functions could lead to corner solutions. We suppose that they do not
arise. Furthermore, quasi-linear preferences imply that monetary transfers are equivalent to transferable utility
among the principals and their common agent. This is usual and acceptable in the partial equilibrium analysis of
industrial organization (Dixit et al. 1997), even though it would be inappropriate in a more general framework.
7to the environmental damage created to each citizen by local pollution, environmentalists' utility
decreases when foreign pollution increases. Therefore, their utility function can be written as
follows:
UE = U ¡ °E¤(X;A) (6)
where, E¤(X;A) = (1 ¡ µ¤)e(x¤;a¤
d) + µ¤e(x;ad) is the overall pollution in the foreign country.
We assume that pollution leakage is symmetric between countries, i.e. µ = µ¤. ° is the disutility
incurred to environmentalists by each unit of pollution abroad.
Citizens receive two common sources of income, a wage l and a lump-sum transfer R(:). The
transfer is ¯nanced from the revenue of the pollution tax. The y good is produced in a perfectly
competitive sector with constant returns to scale and labor as the only input. As we have
normalized the price of y to 1 and labor is assumed to be mobile domestically, the wage rate is
equal to 1 in both sectors. The third source of income are ¯rms' pro¯ts and they are allocated
to shareholders as dividends. Recall that\unethical shareholders"hold shares in polluting ¯rms
whereas \ethical shareholders" are the owners of the domestic eco-industry ¯rm. From utility
maximization subject to given income Ik,8 we derive the demand function for good x as d(P),
where d(:) is the inverse of u0(x). Consumption of the numeraire good equals yk = Ik ¡ Pd(P).
Therefore, the indirect utility function of citizens is:
vk = Ik + u[d(P)] ¡ Pd(P) ¡ ºE(X;A) ¡ ¿:°E¤(X;A) (7)
where ¿ is a dummy variable equal to 1 for environmentalists and 0 otherwise.
3 The political model
The welfare of this economy is:
W = L + CS(:) + R(:) + ¦ + ¦up ¡ ºE ¡ ¹ ®E°E¤ (8)
where L stands for overall wages and CS(:) for consumers' surplus. In a traditional normative
approach, the government would choose its environmental taxation by maximizing that function.
In our approach though, its choice deviates from the social welfare maximization policy if lobby
groups o®er positive contributions. Let Mk(t) be the contribution of lobby group k if the policy
chosen is t. The payo® function vg of the government becomes:




8k 2 K = fC;E;US;ESg stands for consumers, environmentalists and both types of shareholders
8where ¸ is the political weight given to the economy's welfare. We introduce three lobby groups:
environmentalists and both types of shareholders. We do not consider the way these lobby
groups form and overpass the free-riding problem (see Olson (1965) for a discussion on the logic
of collective action). We assume that lobby groups are functionally specialized. While examples
of lobby groups with multiple goals can be found, empirical studies seem to show that pressure
groups are highly specialized (Aidt 2005). They only care about one particular aspect of an issue,
namely pollution for environmentalists|who, nevertheless, are also consumers|and pro¯ts for
shareholders|who are also consumers and su®er from pollution.
3.1 The Game
The political game is a two-stage common agency game where lobby groups are principals and
the government the only agent. The objective of the incumbent government is to be reelected.
This implies that it cares about the utility level achieved by the representative voter, particularly
if voters are well informed about the e®ects of government policy and base their vote partly on
their standard of living. The incumbent politician also values political contributions for ¯nancing
future campaigns and deterring competitors. Therefore, it is going to maximize a weighted
function of national welfare and lobbies contributions. Political contributions are proposed by
lobby groups. Lobby groups move ¯rst and simultaneously o®er the government contribution
schedules that specify the payment to be made to the government as a function of the pollution
tax. Lobbies make contributions up to the point where the bene¯t on their pay-o® function of the
resulting change in economic policies is exactly o®set by the marginal cost of the contributions.
Taking the contribution schedules and the economic behavior of the private sector as given, the
government moves second and implements the politically optimal pollution tax.
Bernheim & Whinston (1986) characterizes the equilibrium for a menu auction problem with
a ¯nite set of actions. Their model has found many applications, including the study of lobbying
for tari®s (Grossman & Helpman 1994) and for consumer and producer taxes and subsidies
(Dixit 1996). Fredriksson (1997) precises the conditions ensuring the existence of a truthful
equilibrium for an environmental tax from a choice set T. For this menu auction, a set of
contribution schedules and a policy tpo is a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium if four main
conditions are satis¯ed.
Lemma 2 Fredriksson (1997): (fMkpo
gk2K;tpo) is a Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium i®
1. Mkpo




+ ¸W(t) on T;




(t) + ¸W(t) on T for every j 2 K;
94. for every j 2 K, there exists a t¡j 2 T that maximizes
P
k2K Mkpo
(t)+¸W(t) on T such
that Mkpo
(t¡j) = 0.
First, each contribution schedule has to be feasible (it has to be positive and lower than the
overall resources of the lobby group). Second, the policy tpo must maximize the government's
pay-o® function, taking the contribution schedules as given. Third, given the schedule of lobby
group j, and the government's anticipated decision rule, no lobby group i has a feasible strategy
that yields a net payo® greater than the equilibrium net payo®. In other words, the shapes of
the schedules reveal the true preferences in the neighborhood of the equilibrium. We extend this
notion of truthfulness|as Bernheim & Whinston (1986) do|to de¯ne a truthful contribution
schedule. It is a contribution schedule that everywhere re°ects the true preferences of the lobby.
Truthful schedules are di®erentiable, because pay-o® functions are di®erentiable. Bernheim &
Whinston (1986) showed that players bear essentially no cost from playing truthful strategies,
because the set of best responses to any strategies played by one's opponents includes a strategy
that is truthful. They also showed that truthful Nash equilibria are the only equilibria stable
to non-binding communications among the players. Fourth, the \anchor" level of net welfare
from which each lobby decides of its political contribution must be chosen such that there exists
a policy that elicits a contribution of zero from the lobby which the government ¯nds equally
attractive as the equilibrium policy.9
3.2 Polluters' contribution to the environmental tax
®us% of polluters' shareholders decide to form a lobby. As lobbies are assumed functionally spe-
cialized, the policy preference of polluters is only determined by the impact of the environmental
policy on pro¯ts. Their payo® function vus is then equal to:
vus = ®us¦ = ®us[Px ¡ cd(x) ¡ pad ¡ te(x;ad)] (10)
The lobby supports a change in the environmental policy that can ensure an increase in pro¯ts.
As contributions have been assumed truthful, the way pro¯ts vary according to the tax rate
precises whether contributions are increasing or decreasing in the pollution tax. Contrary to
the individuals' decisions, the lobby considers the impact of polluters' demand in environmental

































dt . Using the envelop theorem, the net impact of a tax variation









Proposition 1 The lobby of polluting ¯rms o®ers political contributions to lessen the environ-
mental tax.
Proof: The ¯rst term into brackets is necessarily negative. The second term is negatively
correlated with the price of abatement activities. As it is shown in Lemma 1,
@p
@t > 0, i.e. an
increase in t shifts upward the domestic demand in environmental goods. Appendix 2 recalls that
overall, world production of abatement activities increases with a higher tax. The combination
of a shift in the demand function and a higher production pattern implies an increase in the
equilibrium price of abatement activities. ¤
As the pay-o® function of the lobby of polluting ¯rms is negatively correlated to the environ-
mental tax, its political contributions is decreasing in the pollution tax.
3.3 The eco-industry's contribution to the pollution tax
A proportion ®es of the eco-industry's shareholders is assumed to form a new lobby. Like the
polluters' lobby, their payo® function ves is characterized by their pro¯t function.
ves = ®es¦up = ®es[p(A;t;t¤)as ¡ cu(as)] (13)




























s is the production of the foreign ¯rm. From the envelop theorem, the net e®ect of a



















When Home changes its environmental taxation, it increases demand in environmental goods
and services, and therefore their price. Some of this excess demand is supplied by foreign eco-
industries, which has a negative impact on domestic pro¯ts. The impact on the production
patterns of both ¯rms depends on their relative cost functions. Canton (2006) presents a case
of asymmetric competition in which an increase in a tax rate can reduce the production of an
11eco-industry ¯rm. It happens when ¯rms are asymmetric enough and concerns the low cost ¯rm.
However, pro¯ts of both ¯rms increase anyway. In fact, it is always possible to produce as much
as before and as the new price is higher, pro¯ts at the former production level are also more
important. Therefore, even if a ¯rm decides to produce less, its pro¯ts increase.
Proposition 2 An increase in the pollution tax shifts upward the demand in abatement activi-
ties. It has a positive impact on eco-industry's pro¯ts, which gives incentives to its lobby to push
toward higher tax rates.
We can notice that in a closed economy framework, the lobby of eco-industries would also
push toward a more stringent environmental taxation and the polluters' lobby would maintain
contributions toward a reduction in the tax. Therefore, an open-economy context does not
change the qualitative results about the political contributions of independent industrial lobbies.
However, this result does not hold anymore when we consider the decision of a vertical industrial
lobby.
3.4 Political contribution of a vertical industrial lobby
We have assumed so far that sectors were segmented. However, the limit between eco-industries
and downstream polluting industries is not always so clear. When interactions are repeated,
contracts can be used between upstream and downstream ¯rms. An often emphasized example
concerns the supply of air control equipment to oil re¯neries. This technology needs repeated
interactions and the presence of eco-industry sub-contractors in the re¯neries, which led to the
emergence of contracts between downstream and upstream ¯rms. These contracts introduce
more complex relationships than the price-quantity one.10 Moreover, it can also happen that
upstream and downstream ¯rms decide to lobby together, either because they have common
shareholders|one can think of trust funds holding a portfolio of di®erent activities|or because
they have a similar interest on one speci¯c issue. Recall the example described in introduction
about catalytic converters. From sub-contractors to car sellers, the whole supply chain of German
car manufacturers took a similar position on the issue.
So, we study in this subsection a case where a proportion ®jp of all the shareholders of this
economy decides to form a vertical industrial lobby. The objective of this lobby is to maximize
joint pro¯ts, which implies that side-payments are allowed between downstream and upstream
¯rms. The payo® function vjp of this lobby is then equal to:
vjp = ®jp¦jp = ®jp[Px ¡ cd(x) ¡ p(A;t;t¤)(ad ¡ as) ¡ te(x;ad) ¡ cu(as)] (16)
10For a treatment of vertical contracts on strategic environmental policies, see Hamilton & Requate (2004)
12Simplifying this expression by using the ¯rst order condition of pro¯t maximization of the



















One can see immediately that in a closed-economy framework, the ¯rst two terms are equal
to zero. In that case, overall pro¯ts necessarily decrease with an increase in the environmental
tax. In fact, a more stringent environmental regulation increases tax revenues given to the
government while at the same time increasing production costs of the eco-industry. As the
revenues of the eco-industry are only transfers between ¯rms, nothing positive is to be expected
from an increase in the tax for the vertical supply chain.
When the market of abatement activities is global, the ¯rst term can be positive if it is
optimal for the foreign eco-industry ¯rm to reduce its level of production with an increase in the
tax. The second term is positive if Home is a net exporter. In other words, a positive impact
of the environmental policy on ¯rms' pro¯ts can be expected if the international position of
the domestic eco-industry ¯rm is favorable. The following proposition sums up the industry
position.
Proposition 3 (i) The policy preference of a lobby maximizing joint pro¯ts is indeterminate.
(ii) A necessary condition for this lobby to contribute toward an increase in the pollution tax
is a dominant position of the domestic eco-industry on the international market of abatement
activities.
This analysis can explain the behavior of German car manufacturers, which chose to push toward
more stringent emission standards as they knew that it was only with highly restrictive standards
that they would be e±cient enough to impose their technologies on international markets. As
German eco-industries were winning market shares on European markets, it could compensate
the increase in abatement costs for German car manufacturers.
3.5 Environmentalists' contribution to the pollution tax
Some of the environmentalists create a lobby group. The proportion of organized environmen-
talists is ®E · ¹ ®E. The menu auctions of environmentalists depend on the impact of a change
in the tax on pollution, including pollution abroad. Their gross payo® function vE is:
vE = B ¡ ®EV E = B ¡ ®E[(º(1 ¡ µ) + °µ)e(x;ad) + (ºµ + °(1 ¡ µ))e(x¤;a¤
d)] (18)
13where B is a constant. The policy preference of the environmental group is determined by the
sign of the derivative:
dvE
dt
= ¡®E[(º(1 ¡ µ) + °µ)
de(x;ad)
dt
















dt .11 In a closed-economy frame-




The lobby of environmentalists would unambiguously push toward higher tax rates in order to
reduce local emissions. This result does not hold when the market of abatement activities is
global, as it becomes possible to in°uence foreign emissions through a change in the local tax.
Environmentalists only push toward an increase in the pollution tax if:
ºµ + °(1 ¡ µ)
































In our model, a higher domestic tax increases global abatement activities. It decreases con-
sumption of abatement goods abroad, due to an increase in the price of environmental goods but
it is more than compensated by more environmental inputs consumed at home. This quantity
e®ect does not necessarily signify that overall emissions are reduced. In fact, it depends on the
initial level of abatement activities in both countries. When the initial level of abatement is
identical between countries, the RHS of condition 20 is necessarily higher than one. We know
that j
dad
dt j > j
da¤
d
dt j and the ¯rst term on the RHS is necessarily positive.
However, this work mainly focuses on situations where taxes di®er across countries. In fact,
we have seen in introduction that it is only when the foreign environmental policy is set at a
given low level that it becomes in the interests of environmentalists to in°uence foreign pollution
through local environmental taxation. When initial environmental tax rates are such that t > t¤,
we know that ad > a¤
d and thus w0(ad) < w0(a¤
d). In other words, as depollution activities have
decreasing returns to scale, if the initial tax rate is signi¯cantly higher at home than it is abroad,
the marginal impact on emissions of an increase in the environmental tax can be less important
at home than abroad, leading a bigger world amount of emissions.
De¯nition 1 We de¯ne countries as symmetric (resp. asymmetric) when an increase in the
11We have assumed that depollution is end-of-pipe. Thus, a change in the price of environmental inputs has no
in°uence on the foreign optimal production pattern (
dx¤
dt = 0).
14domestic pollution tax reduces (resp. increases) overall pollution. In other words, countries are






j is higher (resp. lower) than 1.
Using the previous de¯nition, the following proposition summarizes environmentalists' political
in°uence on environmental taxes.
Proposition 4 1. When countries are symmetric:
(a) If º > °, environmentalists are always in favor of an increase in the tax;
(b) If º < °, environmentalists are only in favor of an increase in the tax if pollution is
relatively mobile;
2. When countries are asymmetric:
(a) If º < °, environmentalists are never in favor of a higher environmental tax;
(b) If º > °, environmentalists are only in favor of an increase in the tax if pollution is
relatively immobile.
Proof: Let us call ©(µ) the LHS of Condition 20. (i) If º < °, ©(µ) is decreasing in µ and
µ 2 [0;1=2] ) ©(µ) 2 [1;
°
º]. Thus, if countries are asymmetric, condition 20 cannot be
ful¯lled. If countries are symmetric, it is satis¯ed when µ is not too low, i.e. when pollution
spillovers among countries are important enough. (ii) If º > °, ©(µ) is increasing in µ and
µ 2 [0;1=2] ) ©(µ) 2 [
°
º;1]. Thus, if countries are symmetric, condition 20 is always ful¯lled.
If countries are asymmetric, it is be satis¯ed only if µ is not too high, i.e. when pollution is
mainly local. ¤
When countries are symmetric, world pollution is reduced by an increase in the domestic
tax. In addition, if environmentalists' utility is more a®ected by one unit of pollution at home
than abroad, their utility always increases with an increase in the domestic tax. Even though
pollution is increased abroad, it cannot compensate the rise in utility due to the reduction in
domestic pollution. It is not the case anymore when environmentalists su®er more from one unit
of pollution abroad. When pollution is relatively immobile, it can be in the environmentalists'
interest to lobby toward a reduction in the pollution tax as it is going to reduce pollution
abroad. This puzzling result actually corresponds to Greenpeace's behavior with respect to
French aircraft carrier Cl¶ emenceau. Greenpeace France has pushed for an increase in domestic
pollution in order to ensure a decrease in foreign pollution because the NGO judged that the
marginal environmental damage was lower in France|one can think of a higher protection for
workmen|than their perception of each unit of emissions abroad. However, this argument does
not hold if pollution is global, as the increase in domestic emissions is going to increase pollution
su®ered abroad anyway.
15In the case of asymmetric countries, the increase in foreign emissions more than compensates
a reduction in domestic emissions when a more restrictive environmental policy is introduced.
Therefore, it is only when pollution is rather local and when environmentalists are more con-
cerned by domestic pollution that they support a more stringent domestic environmental policy.
Take the case of clean development mechanisms (CDM) in the Kyoto Protocol. CDM are a
way to lessen the pressure of climate policies in countries listed in Annexe 1 by including the
¯nancing of foreign abatement investments. These mechanisms are supported by environmental
NGOs because there is the risk that countries not included in Annexe 1 would increase their
emissions so much that it would compensate the e®orts made by developed countries, increasing
worldwide pollution. However, environmental NGOs refuse to support the addition of carbon
sinks to these mechanisms. It is de¯nitely a way to compensate greenhouse gas emissions from
developed countries but it also includes a reduction in bio-diversity, which directly damages
foreign environment, an element not taken into account by Annexe 1 countries' governments.
Note that Case 1.b) can be seen as a reinterpretation of Proposition 1 in Aidt (2005). Indeed,
Case 2.b) can correspond to a special case of Proposition 1 in Conconi (2003), when emission
leakage comes through the price of abatement activities. Our work di®ers from previous analy-
ses for two reasons. First, we generalize environmentalists' behaviors for all kinds of preferences
and whatever the type of pollution considered. Second, we emphasize that international in-
teractions in the polluting sector are not a necessary condition to explain why in some cases
environmentalists push to lessen tax rates. Emission leakage through the abatement market is
su±cient.
3.6 Common interests between environmentalists and the eco-industry
Empirically, it happens that environmentalists and eco-industry lobbies launch common political
campaigns. These common campaigns can only happen if their interests are aligned. The
following table precises in a context of symmetric and asymmetric countries in which cases they
have similar interests. In rows, we di®erentiate between symmetric and asymmetric countries.
In columns, we detail environmentalists' preferences with regard to environmental damage at
home and abroad and in each situation, we present the cases of local and global emissions. A
+ (resp. ¡) indicates that a pressure group lobbies toward an increase (resp. a decrease) in the
environmental tax.
When pollution is mainly local, the interests of both pressure groups are aligned if environ-
mentalists value more pollution at home than abroad. When pollution is global, lobbies push
in the same direction under the condition that countries are symmetric, i.e. overall pollution is
reduced following a more stringent domestic regulation. It corresponds to the example empha-
sized in introduction of a common campaign launched by environmentalists and eco-industries
in order to strengthen the new EU Energy Services Directive. In fact, pollution from energy
16Environmentalists
º < ° º > °
Loc Poll Glob Poll Loc Poll Glob Poll
Eco- Sym. Countries (+,-) (+,+) (+,+) (+,+)
Industry Asym. Countries (+,-) (+,-) (+,+) (+,-)
Figure 1: Positions of environmentalists and the eco-industry toward the environmental tax
suppliers is in general global|greenhouse gas emissions, nuclear accident, :::|and electricity
demand is mainly local, so a change in the price on the European electricity market has a low
impact on the foreign energy market price. Therefore, pollution abroad should not increase too
much following a more stringent Energy Services Directive and the interests of environmentalists
and the eco-industry are aligned.
4 The politically optimal environmental policy
We can now present the impacts of lobbying activities on the government's policy. We ¯rst
consider as a yardstick what the socially optimal tax would be if the regulator was benevolent.
4.1 The socially optimal tax
If the government was benevolent, it would maximize the following function:
W = L +
Z x
0
Pdu ¡ Px + te(x;ad) + Px ¡ cd(x) ¡ p(A)ad ¡ te(xs;ad)
+ p(A)as ¡ cu(as) ¡ ºE(X;A) ¡ ¹ ®E°E¤(X;A) (21)
Simple algebra yields:
W = L +
Z x
0
Pdu ¡ cd(x) ¡ p(A)(ad ¡ as) ¡ cu(as) ¡ ºE(X;A) ¡ ¹ ®E°E¤(X;A) (22)
The optimal environmental taxation would be given by the following condition:
dW
dt


























17Simplifying this equation by using ¯rst order conditions of pro¯t maximization for both ¯rms,
we get the following condition:
dW
dt
































Let us call ± = º(1 ¡ µ) + ¹ ®E°µ the average marginal disutility on citizens of one unit of
domestic emissions and ±¤ = ºµ + ¹ ®E°(1 ¡ µ) the average marginal disutility on citizens of one
unit of foreign emissions. Then, the socially optimal pollution tax should be chosen such that:
























Proposition 5 An optimal pollution tax chosen by a benevolent regulator would deviate from
the average marginal environmental damage according to three distortions: (i) the market power
of eco-industries, (ii) strategic incentives in the eco-industry market and (iii) the impact of
domestic taxes on foreign emissions.
The intuitions behind the ¯rst two distortions have already been discussed in the literature.
The ¯rst term between brackets on the RHS of Equation 25 explains that the regulator must
tax emissions more severely than the Pigouvian rate in order to lessen the distortion induced by
the market power of eco-industries. The second one is a rent-shifting e®ect. As some of the new
abatement activities are supplied by the foreign ¯rm, there is an incentive for the local regulator
to lessen the pollution tax.12 The last term considers a new element, namely the impact of an
increase in the domestic tax on foreign emissions. It tends to push toward a reduction in the
domestic pollution tax. In fact, one unit of foreign emissions can increase domestic environmental
damage through pollution leakage if pollution is transboundary and has in any case a negative
impact on environmentalists' utility as it increases foreign pollution.
One can notice that if the price of abatement activities becomes exogenous|for instance if
¯rms and countries are too small to in°uence it|all three terms disappear and the optimal tax
is chosen equal to the average marginal environmental damage. In fact, eco-industry ¯rms lose
their market power and as the price of abatement activities does not change, the incentives of
the foreign eco-industry and polluting ¯rms are not modi¯ed. In a closed economy framework,
only the ¯rst term would be maintained, leading to a tax unambiguously higher than the average
marginal environmental damage.
12This holds true under the condition that
da¤
s
dt > 0. We have shown in Canton (2006) that it is not always the
case. In those cases, there is one more incentive to push toward a higher tax rate.
184.2 The tax optimizing the government's political payo® function
In our model, the incumbent government maximizes its own political payo® function. Thus, the
socially optimal policy is balanced according to the auctions menu proposed by lobby groups
such as to maximize the following payo® function:




So, as we have seen that we can restrict our analysis to truthful Nash equilibria, the government
actually determines the politically optimal pollution tax as follows:
dvg
dt







































¸±¤ + ®E±¤E´ de(x¤;a¤
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dt





with ±E = º(1 ¡ µ) + °µ is the environmentalists' marginal environmental damage of one unit
of domestic emissions and ±¤E
= ºµ + °(1 ¡ µ) the environmentalists' marginal environmental
damage of one unit of foreign emissions.
Proposition 6 (i) The menu auctions proposed by lobby groups modify the optimal pollution tax
in two ways: they change the relative weight given to each distortion emphasized in the socially
optimal scenario and they introduce two other distortions. (ii) One cannot conclude in a general
context whether political competition over-internalizes or under-internalizes the environmental
externality.
Each lobby contributes to modify one particular economic distortion emphasized in Equa-
tion 25. For instance, environmentalists increase the weight of the marginal environmental
damage|due to local or foreign pollution|in the government's payo® function. Eco-industries,
on the other hand, push to increase the consideration of the rent-shifting consequences of the
environmental tax, while polluting ¯rms want to emphasize the eco-industry's market power.
Each distortion is modi¯ed according to the proportion of lobbyists in each pressure group. To
those elements, the political game adds two other ones. The lobby of polluting ¯rms takes into
consideration the tax paid on each unit of pollution. When the tax rate increases, it increases
the tax revenues perceived by the government, which is negatively correlated to polluting ¯rms'
19pro¯ts. Both industrial lobbies also consider the shift in the demand function following a change
in the tax. It has a positive impact on the eco-industry but a negative one on polluting ¯rms,
as it increases the price of environmental goods. The net impact depends on the degree of con-
centration of each lobby and on the share of the overall supply or demand they represent in the
international abatement market. Overall, as each lobby acts according to its own interests and
as they are not similar, it is not clear whether the politically optimal tax will be set lower or
higher than the socially optimal one.
If the price of abatement activities was maintained constant, only two incentives would re-
main. Environmentalists would keep lobbying toward a higher consideration for their local
environmental damage and polluting ¯rms would emphasize the impact of a change in the tax
rate on tax revenues. However, eco-industries would have no interest in political contributions
as their pro¯ts would not be modi¯ed by a change in the tax. In a closed-economy framework,
no rent-shifting e®ect would exist and the local tax would have no impact on foreign emissions.
Both elements would disappear from the politically optimal environmental taxation.
4.3 Comparative statics
Using the implicit function theorem, we proceed to comparative statics. We assume that the
second order condition of the government's payo® function maximization is satis¯ed. Therefore,
a change in one of the model's parameters has an impact of the same sign on the politically
optimal tax than it has on the ¯rst order condition.
An increase in ¸ gives more weight to welfare in the regulator's payo® function, meaning that
the tax gets closer to its optimal level. One can check that when ¸ ! +1, then tpo ! tso.
A rise of membership in one of the lobby groups means that at the margin, the group is
willing to contribute more money to the government. Consequently, the government adjusts the
pollution tax depending on the strategy of each lobby characterized by Propositions 1-2-4. As
lobbies are functionally specialized, there are no distributional e®ects.
@tpo
@ ¹ ®E > 0 , ¡¸° dE¤
dt > 0. A rise of unorganized environmentalists increases (resp. decreases)
the politically optimal tax if foreign overall pollution decreases (resp. increases) with an increase
in the domestic tax. More environmentalists mean that the relative weight given to foreign
pollution is increased in the welfare function. We observe that a change in the number of
shareholders for polluting and eco-industry ¯rms does not in°uence the optimal pollution tax.
Only the proportion of organized shareholders matters.
@tpo
@º > 0 , ¡(¸ + ®E)dE
dt > 0: an increase in marginal damage increases (resp. decreases)
the political tax if domestic pollution is reduced (resp. increased) by a rise in the environmental
tax. This e®ect takes place both via the impact on welfare and on the environmentalists' payo®
function.
20@tpo
@° > 0 , ¡(®E + ¸ ¹ ®E)dE¤
dt > 0: more disutility with regard to foreign pollution leads to a
lower (resp. higher) political tax at home if foreign pollution increases (resp. decreases) with an
increase in the domestic tax. Here again, this e®ect takes place both via the impact on welfare
and on the environmentalists' payo® function.
@tpo





> 0. An increase in environmental spillovers
contributes to increase the environmental tax if º < ° ®E+¸ ¹ ®E
®E+¸ . When µ is high, an increase in
the tax makes local consumers less sensitive to local emissions and more sensitive to foreign
ones. As an increase in the tax reduces local emissions and increases foreign ones, the higher
the tax, the more signi¯cant local pollution. Therefore, it is only when º is low compared to °
that the government has an interest in increasing the tax.
5 Conclusion
This work is a ¯rst attempt to introduce the eco-industry sector in the positive analysis of
environmental regulation. As shown through many examples, the environment industry has
strong incentives to create its own lobby. Furthermore, it also tends to modify the traditional
behaviors of conventional lobbies, namely polluters and environmentalists. Therefore, we wanted
to discuss in a general context the di®erent positions taken by these three lobbies. We have shown
that it is always in the interest of the eco-industry to push toward more restrictive environmental
policies, as they shift upward the demand in abatement activities. We have also emphasized
that the emergence of an international market for abatement activities can o®er incentives for a
vertical industrial lobby to give contributions toward higher tax rates when it is an opportunity
to capture foreign rents. Indeed, when foreign environmental policy is exogenous, it can be in
the interest of environmentalists to lobby for a less stringent environmental policy at home, so
as to reduce pollution abroad. Furthermore, we have also underlined the conditions under which
environmentalists and eco-industries can be political allies. We tend to believe that only in
these cases their lobbying activities can compensate polluters' campaign contributions toward
less restrictive environmental policies, as they will be more organized and more powerful than
isolated green lobbies.
This work can be improved in various ways. At ¯rst, the institutional framework of devel-
oping countries is meant to change, leading place to more stringent environmental policies in
these countries. Therefore, a political game introducing the possibility for local pressure groups
to lobby abroad will be relevant. Furthermore, the formation of stable coalitions among the
di®erent stakeholders should be considered. It would be a way to precise why in some cases,
environmentalists and eco-industries launch common campaigns and why in other cases, they
take independent decisions. More work is also needed to understand the economic interactions
21between the eco-industry sector and the polluting one as they have a direct impact on the
political contributions chosen by both lobbies.
6 Appendix
6.1 Conditions for a unique equilibrium on the eco-industry market
Lemma 3 Let us consider a Cournot game with 2 asymmetric players. Let p : R++ ! R be
the C2 inverse demand function in abatement activities which veri¯es 8A 2 ]0;+1[, p(A) >
maxfcu;c¤
ug, limA!0 p0(A) > ¡1 and p00(A) · 0. Under these restrictions, there exists a unique
Cournot equilibrium in which each ¯rm maximizes its pro¯ts given by ¦(as;a¤
s) = p(as+a¤
s)as¡
cu(as) for the domestic ¯rm and ¦(as;a¤




s) for the foreign ¯rm.
We make the demonstration for the domestic ¯rm. It can be proceeded to a symmetric analysis
in the foreign case. Let us construct H : R+£R+ ! R, given by H (as;A) = p(A)+p0(A)as¡cu
and let us observe that:
￿ 8(as;A) 2 ]0;+1[
2, @asH(as;A) = p0(A) < 0
￿ 8A 2 ]0;+1[, limas!0 H (as;A) = p(A) ¡ cu > 0
￿ 8A 2 ]0;+1[, limas!+1 H (as;A) = p(A) + limas!+1 p0(A)as ¡ cu = ¡1
We can therefore conclude that 8A 2 ]0;+1[, 9 ^ as = Ã(A) a unique aswith the property that
H (Ã(A);A) = 0:
￿ The second order condition is satis¯ed since this one is given by
@asH (as;as + a¤
s)jas= ^ as = @asH(as;A)jas= ^ as + @AH(as;A)jas= ^ as
= 2p0(A) + p"(A) ^ as < 0
￿ A unique Cournot equilibrium exists if ¡(A) = H(as;A) + H¤(a¤
s;A) = 2p(A) + p0(A)A ¡
cu ¡ c¤
u = 0 admits a unique solution.
Let us now check this last point. First, we de¯ne ¤(A) = 2p(A) + p0(A)A, for A ¸ 0, as the
aggregate marginal revenue of the industry and £(A) = cu + c¤
u its aggregate marginal cost.











So, the aggregate marginal revenue of the industry is strictly decreasing and the aggregate
marginal cost is constant. Now remark that:
￿ limA!+1 ¤(A) = ¡1 since limA!+1 p0(A)A = ¡1 and limA!+1 p(A) must be ¯nite
otherwise p0(A) < 0 makes no sense.
￿ limA!0 ¤(A) = 2p(A) + p0(A)A > cu + c¤
u
Therefore, there exists a unique equilibrium value ^ A > 0 for which the aggregate marginal
revenue equals the aggregate marginal cost.
6.2 Comparative statics
Equation 2 gives the optimal decision of the polluting ¯rm with regard to its level of production
x. Adding to this Equation the optimal decision on the demand side, i.e. u0(x) = P, we get the












A + cu + c¤
u = 0 (30)















The denominator is always negative and we know that
@p
@t is necessarily positive. In our analysis,
the inverse demand function has the remarkable property that it can be written as the product of







¤(A) is the aggregate marginal revenue of the industry. As this value is necessarily positive at
the equilibrium, we know that the numerator of Equation 31 is positive. So, an increase in the
pollution tax necessarily induces a higher world production and consumption of environmental
goods.
23Main notations
￿ x (resp. x¤): domestic (resp. foreign) production and consumption of the ¯nal goods.
X = x + x¤
￿ P: exogenous international price of the ¯nal good.
￿ ad (resp. a¤
d): demand in environmental goods made by domestic (resp. foreign) polluting
¯rms
￿ as (resp. a¤
s): supply in environmental goods by the domestic (resp. foreign) eco-industry
¯rm. A = ad + a¤
d = as + a¤
s
￿ p(A;t;t¤): world price of abatement activities
￿ cd(x): production costs of the domestic polluting industry
￿ cu(as) (resp. c¤
u(a¤
s)): production costs of the domestic (resp. foreign) eco-industry
￿ t (resp. t¤): domestic (resp. foreign) per unit environmental tax rate
￿ ²(x): gross emission function of polluters
￿ w(ad): depollution function of polluters
￿ e(x;ad) = ²(x)¡w(ad) (resp. e(x¤;a¤
d) = ²(x¤)¡w(a¤
d)): net emission function of domestic
(resp. foreign) polluting ¯rms.
￿ º: marginal environmental damage of one unit of pollution at home
￿ °: marginal disutility for environmentalists of one unit of pollution abroad
￿ µ: measure of the impact of one unit of domestic emission on foreign pollution
￿ l: wage rate of one unit of labor supply. L are the overall wages in the economy.
￿ ¿: dummy variable equal to 1 for environmentalists and 0 otherwise.
￿ ®us: proportion of the polluting ¯rm's shareholders engaged in the polluter's lobby
￿ ®es: proportion of the eco-industry's shareholders engaged in lobbying activities
￿ ¹ ®E: proportion of citizens that are environmentalists
￿ ®E: proportion of environmentalists engaged in lobbying activities
￿ vus: payo® function of the polluter's lobby
24￿ ves: payo® function of the eco-industry's lobby
￿ vE: payo® function of the environmentalists' lobby
￿ vg: government's payo® function
￿ vjp: payo® function of a vertical industrial lobby
￿ ¸: weight given to welfare in the government's payo® function
￿ ± (resp. ±¤): average marginal damage of one unit of domestic (resp. foreign) emissions
on domestic citizens
￿ ±E (resp. ±¤E
): marginal damage of one unit of domestic (resp. foreign) emissions on
environmentalists
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